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ABSTRACT
Objective: To assess the utility of data already existing
within hospitals for monitoring patient safety.
Setting: An acute hospital in southern England.
Design: Mapping of data sources proposed by staff as
potentially able to identify patient safety issues followed
by an in-depth analysis of the content of seven key
sources.
Data source analysis: For each data source: scope and
depth of content in relation to patient safety, number and
type of patient safety incidents identified, degree of
overlap with incidents identified by different sources,
levels of patient harm associated with incidents.
Results: A wide range of data sources existing within the
hospital setting have the potential to provide information
about patient safety incidents. Poor quality of coding,
delays in reports reaching databases, the narrow focus of
some data sources, limited data-collection periods and
lack of central collation of findings were some of the
barriers to making the best use of routine data sources for
monitoring patient safety. An in-depth analysis of seven
key data sources (Clinical Incident database, Health and
Safety Incident database, Complaints database, Claims
database and Inquest database, the Patient
Administration System and case notes) indicated that
case notes have the potential to identify the largest
number of incidents and provide the richest source of
information on such incidents. The seven data sources
identified different types of incidents with differing levels
of patient harm. There was little overlap between the
incidents identified by different sources.
Conclusion: Despite issues related to the quality of
coding, depth of information available and accessibility,
triangulating information from more than one source can
identify a broader range of incidents and provide
additional information related to professional groups
involved, types of patients affected and important
contributory factors. Such an approach can provide a
focus for further work and ultimately contributes to the
identification of appropriate interventions that improve
patient safety.
An integrated approach to risk management
requires healthcare organisations to gather infor-
mation on risk and safety from a range of
information sources so that the scale and nature
of key risk areas can be assessed. At a national
level, the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA)
has established a Patient Safety Observatory to
quantify, characterise and prioritise patient safety
issues by bringing together information held by
different organisations.1 At a local level, despite the
fact that hospitals in the UK collect a wealth of
data on many aspects of patient care, these data
have been seen as an underutilised source of
information on patient safety.2 The majority of
hospitals in England and Wales rely on voluntary
reports of patient safety incidents (defined by the
NPSA as unintended or unexpected incidents that
could have led or did lead to harm for one or more
patients3) to Local Risk Management Systems
(LRMS) to identify trends and areas for further
investigation. The NPSA’s national database (the
National Reporting and Learning System) consists
almost entirely of data derived from this system.
However, this approach has been criticised as
potentially misleading. A few studies have com-
pared the number and types of incidents identified
by LRMS with those identified by other sources
including case notes,4 internal departmental inci-
dent reporting systems5 and computerised hospital
administrative records.6 7 These have shown that
LRMS can fail to pick up serious incidents and are
more likely to identify incidents not attributable to
direct staff action such as falls than those related to
clinical care. Evidence also suggests that nurses
report more incidents than other staff groups, with
significant under reporting by doctors.8
A variety of methods have been used to identify
adverse events affecting hospitalised patients
including retrospective case note review,9–11 in-
person collection of information from staff and
case records on the wards,12 direct observation,13
screening of administrative data14 and staff and
patient surveys.15 Comparisons of incidents
detected by different methods have shown rela-
tively little overlap between sources.4 7 16 These
findings suggest that there may be a value in
bringing together information on patient safety
from a wider range of sources. While most
hospitals do not have the resources to institute
some of the methodologies used in these studies, it
is plausible that they are able to make better use of
the data sources that they currently have. This
study investigated the range of sources information
relevant to patient safety found within a single
acute hospital in England, the scope of information
held by these sources and how it might be used to
examine key areas of patient safety.
METHODS
Design
A mapping exercise, including semistructured
interviews with 33 clinical and non-clinical staff,
direct examination of data sources and attendance
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at clinical governance meetings, was used to identify potentially
useful hospital data sources in a large district general hospital in
southern England with 850 beds and approximately 40 000
admissions per year.
By judging each source against the criteria of number and
types of incidents that could be identified, mode of data
collection, accessibility and content, seven sources were selected
for more detailed analysis. Retrospective data collection was
undertaken in respect of adult medical and surgical inpatients
admitted between 1 April 2004 and 31 March 2005. Data
sources were assessed to identify the completeness of informa-
tion found in each source, the number and types of incident
detected, patient harm resulting from each incident and the
degree of overlap between incidents identified by different
sources. An incident was registered if the coded event suggested
the potential to cause patient harm, even if harm was not
explicitly recorded, as information on harm was not always
available from some sources. All incidents detected were coded
by category and by level of harm using the standard coding
system employed by the National Reporting and Learning
System (NRLS) (table 1).17 Completeness of information was
assessed by identifying how many of the data items required by
the NRLS incident report form were present.18 Using patient full
name as an identifier, the degree of overlap between records
held on each database was examined.
Data sources
The sources interrogated included:
Five databases which made up the Trust’s Local Risk Management
System
The Clinical Incident database, Health and Safety Incident
database, Complaints database, Claims database and
Inquest database were searched for patient-identifiable entries
linked to adult medical and surgical inpatients within the
index year.
Patient Administration System
The Patient Administration System (PAS) was searched using
the 41 three-digit ICD 10 diagnosis codes for complications and
misadventures.19 Within each record, complication or misad-
venture codes appearing in the first of the six diagnostic code
boxes, which is normally used to designate the reason for
admission, were considered to indicate a preadmission event
and excluded.
Case notes
Two hundred and twenty randomly drawn records with an
adult surgical or medical admission within the index year were
reviewed. Reviews were undertaken using a method adapted
from that described by Woloshynowych et al.20 A 10% sample of
case notes with no incident identified and a 25% sample of
positive case notes were further reviewed by a second expert
reviewer (SO). All positive cases were also discussed with two
expert reviewers (SO and GN). The presence of a patient safety
incident was ascribed only if all three reviewers were in
agreement (75% of cases).
RESULTS
Data-quality issues
Table 2 describes the range of data sources that have the
potential to provide information about patient safety incidents
occurring in medical and surgical inpatients that exist within
the hospital. These sources could be divided into four main
types: Incident Reporting Systems, Surveillance Systems,
Audits and others (including case notes, the Patient
Administration System, minutes from Morbidity and
Mortality meetings, written claims and inquest records). Poor
quality of coding, delays in reports reaching databases, the
narrow focus of some data sources, time-limited data-collection
periods and lack of central collation of findings were some of the
barriers that limited the scope for routine data sources to be
used in monitoring patient safety.
Of the seven data sources selected for more detailed analysis,
case notes contained the most detailed information on
individual incidents including risk factors such as age, ethnicity
or comorbidities, time, place and location, description of the
incident, levels of harm and contributory factors. The Clinical
Incident database also contained many of these data items, but
information on risk factors and contributory factors was usually
not entered. In addition, the category of healthcare professional
who was involved in the incident or who made the report was
often missing. It was difficult to make objective assessments of
patient harm for incidents detected in the Complaints database
or on the PAS system. For the former, information on harm was
principally from the patient or carer’s perspective only, and for
the latter there was inadequate detail. Elucidating the temporal
sequence of events was sometimes challenging with individual
PAS records, occasionally leading to difficulty distinguishing
preadmission diagnoses or comorbidities from in-hospital
incidents.
Box 1 Examples of different categories of incident
detected by different data sources
Clinical incidents: medication error
Patient given five doses of Co-dydramol in 1 day, although
prescribed four times daily—no patient complaints. Drug chart
needed rewriting; previous entries illegible.
Complaints: consent, communication and confidentiality
Patient’s daughter raises concerns regarding doctor’s attitude.
When she spoke to doctor, she was told mother was doing very
well, when in fact the doctor was describing a different patient.
Health and Safety incidents: patient accident
Patient being weighed on sitting scales, mobility poor and brakes
loose, scales moved and patient fell on her side to the floor. Slight
graze to existing haematoma on right elbow and possible injury to
right hip.
Claims: treatment and procedure
Patient had right ankle injected instead of left.
Inquest: clinical assessment
Patient attended A&E three times and sent home with diagnosis
of tonsillitis. Prescribed antibiotics. Finally presented with severe
shock requiring resuscitation and surgery. Delay in diagnosing
haemorrhage due to ruptured spleen. Patient died.
Adverse event from case note review: treatment and
procedure
Cystic artery inadvertently cut during laparotomy cholecystect-
omy. Operation converted to a laparoscopy in order to control
bleeding. Blood loss estimated as 2 litres. Postoperative blood
transfusion given.
Error management
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Numbers of incidents and degree of overlap between sources
Table 3 shows the number patient safety incidents identified by
each of the seven data sources in total and the number identified
exclusively by each source. Case notes potentially identify the
largest number incidents. Seventy-one patient safety incidents
were found across 220 inpatient admissions (32.3%). Of these,
40 (18.1%) fulfilled the definition of an adverse event (an
unintended injury or complication of care leading to prolonged
admission, disability at discharge or death and caused by
healthcare management rather than the disease process), the
term most often used to describe incidents in previous studies.
Sixty-five patient safety incidents were single events. Three
patients experienced two incidents during the index admission.
Based on these findings, it can be estimated that 8781(95% CI
6495 to 12 144) incidents could potentially be identified across
the 27 270 adult medical and surgical admissions between 1.4.04
and 31.3.03. The second largest source of patient safety
incidents was the Clinical Incident database with 484 incidents
identified within the index year. This was followed by PAS (462
incidents), Complaints (221 incidents) and Health and Safety
(176 incidents). Inquest and Claims records identified small
numbers of events, 21 and 10, respectively.
Table 4 demonstrates that the degree of overlap between
incidents picked up by different data sources was small.
Types of incidents identified by different data sources
Different data sources tended to identify different proportions
of incidents in each category (table 5), and 37.5% of incidents
identified via the Clinical Incident database were medication
errors and equipment failures. Complaints provide an insight
into incidents related to communication failures (22% of total).
The PAS system, Inquests database and case notes identified
many incidents linked to surgical interventions and to
investigative procedures. The PAS system was also useful in
identifying incidents related to infection control (see Box 1 and
table 6, for examples of incidents detected by different data
sources).
Levels of patient harm
Incidents were graded by severity; the proportion of incidents
graded as causing death, severe, moderate, low or no harm
varied among the different data sources (table 7). Incidents
found in inquest and claims records tended to be associated
with death or serious harm; case records identified incidents
mainly causing moderate or low levels of harm and LRMS
databases captured a higher proportion of incidents causing low
levels of harm or no harm. Although there was not enough
information available to code the majority of incidents detected
by the PAS, 8.4% of patients with a coded complication or
misadventure in their record died (see Box 2 for examples of
incidents graded for differing levels of patient harm).
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to explore the feasibility of using a
range of hospital data sources to identify patient safety
incidents in order to provide a better picture of the scale and
scope of incidents related to key safety issues in an English
hospital. The study focuses on routine data sources that are
available within the hospital setting.
A number of limitations should be considered. The study was
carried out in a single acute hospital, and although data sources
identified by the mapping exercise as containing potentially
useful patient safety information are likely to be present in
other sites, accessibility, quality of coding and completeness
may vary from site to site. The study also focused on data
sources linked to medical and surgical inpatients only. While
these sources also provide information on incidents related to
other specialties and outpatients, there will be additional data
sources that can also be utilised for this purpose, and some
tailoring in relation to the issue being explored is necessary.
Many routine hospital data sources collect data for purposes
other than identifying patient safety incidents. These data are
observational rather than experimental and are prone to biases
Box 2 Examples of incidents graded for differing levels of
patient harm
Clinical incident: no harm impact prevented
Patient’s ‘‘to take home’’ medication mislabelled as 5 mg
Amlodipine when contents in the bag were in fact 10 mg.
Nurse informed pharmacy of error and returned the drugs.
Health and Safety: no harm impact not prevented
Patient found sitting on floor by staff. No obvious injury noted.
Complaints: low
Patient’s son has written regarding her mother was who given a
wrong wrist band in A&E on 2/4/04. He also has other concerns
regarding a cannula which was left in his mother when
discharged.
Claims: moderate
Patient is diabetic with circulatory problems. Allegation made that
insufficient care was taken during his admission to prevent
development of pressure sores, which became infected with
MRSA.
Case note review, adverse event: severe
Patient who was post coronary artery bypass graft gradually
deteriorated over 1 week with symptoms of shortness of breath
and a discharging chest wound. Clinical team failed to investigate
reason for deterioration. After 5 days became acutely unwell and
found to have chest wound breakdown and a passageway
between wound and chest cavity. Transferred to ITU and put on a
ventilator. Recovery took several weeks.
Inquest: death
Patient died following a right hemicolectomy. Cause of death on
post-mortem was (1) haemorrhage due to right hemicolectomy,
(2) Crohn’s disease.
Table 1 National Reporting and Learning System’s harm grading for patient safety incidents
No harm Impact prevented: any patient safety incident that had the potential to cause harm but was prevented, resulting in no harm to people receiving NHS-funded care
Impact not prevented: any patient safety incident that ran to completion but no harm occurred to people receiving NHS-funded care
Low Any patient safety incident that required extra observation or minor treatment
Moderate Any patient safety incident that resulted in a moderate increase in treatment
Severe Any patient safety incident that appears to have resulted in permanent harm
Death Any patient safety incident that directly resulted in death
Error management
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introduced by differential reporting levels, the variable quality
of coding and levels of completeness. The most useful
supplementary information sources would be those that collect
timely data on a continuous basis, which are accessible and have
appropriate content. Timely and continuous data collection is
important for analysis of trends over time. These conditions
limit the use of many hospital sources where data collection is
short-lived and non-recurring. Accessibility is also limited by the
long delays in information reaching some sources, the lack of
central collation, poorly coded electronic information and the
amount of time required to review written records. Staff may
also feel uncomfortable sharing some types of sensitive
information, an attitude difficult to change if the hospital’s
culture is not perceived as open and fair. Important content,
such as information related to risk factors including age, gender,
ethnicity or profession of healthcare worker involved, is often
not available. Furthermore, the patchy nature of data collection
across any healthcare organisation and the narrow focus of
much of this data collection will inevitably mean that there will
be gaps in information in certain areas.
Limited information makes it difficult to identify incidents.
In the Complaints and Claims databases, the descriptions of
events are mainly from the patient or carer’s perspective with
limited information from the hospital, diagnoses in PAS records
do not indicate when they occurred, and information on patient
harm, apart from death, is not available. To get the most out of
the data available, a pragmatic approach was taken to
identifying incidents, judging whether the event described had
the potential to cause patient harm, even if that harm was not
explicitly recorded. This may have led to some overestimation
of the numbers of incidents. The relatively small sample of case
notes reviewed, representing 0.8% of all adult medical and
surgical admissions in the index year, also increases the degree of
uncertainty around estimates of the total number of patient
safety incidents that can be identified by this method. These
problems of validity and reliability highlight why such sources
should not be used for comparisons of facilities. However, they
are less important when hospitals are using the data internally
to pinpoint areas of concern as part of internal quality-
improvement processes.
Table 3 Number of incidents identified by each of the seven data
sources for adult medical and surgical patient admissions between
1.4.04 and 31.3.05
Data source
Total no. of incidents
identified
No. of incidents exclusively
identified by source
Case notes* 8781 NA{
Clinical incidents 484 428
PAS 462 399
Health & Safety 221 197
Complaints 176 148
Inquest 21 10
Claims 10 7
Total 10 190
*Estimate based on a sample of 220 inpatient admissions.
{Of the 71 patient safety incidents identified from case notes, 10 were also found by
other sources.
Table 4 Degree of overlap between incidents identified by each data
source, April 2004 to March 2005
Clinical incidents
(484)
Clinical
incidents
Claims (10) 3 Claims
Inquests (21) 9 0 Inquests
Complaints (176) 4 2 2 Complaints
Health & Safety
(221)
7 0 1 10 Heath &
Safety
PAS (462) 35 1 3 12 14 PAS
Case notes (71) 3 0 0 2 1 6
Table 5 Numbers and proportions of incidents in each category detected by different data sources, April 2004 to March 2005
NPSA incident categories Clinical incidents Complaints Health & Safety Claims Inquests PAS Case notes
Access, admission, transfer 67 (13.8%) 15 (8.5%) 8 (11.3%)
Clinical assessment 39 (8.1%) 12 (6.8%) 2 (20%) 5 (23.8%) 13 (18.3%)
Consent, communication &
confidentiality
33 (6.8%) 39 (22.2%)
Disruptive, aggressive behaviour 2 (0.4%) 1 (0.6%) 2 (0.9%)
Documentation 43 (8.9%) 3 (1.7%)
Care & ongoing monitoring and
review
31 (6.4%) 29 (16.5%) 1 (10%) 1 (4.8%) 7 (9.9%)
Infection control 2 (0.4%) 16 (9.1%) 2 (20%) 1 (4.8%) 181 (39.2%) 9 (12.7%)
Infrastructure 34 (7.0%) 29 (16.5%) 1 (4.8%) 2 (2.8%)
Medical equipment 73 (15.1%) 7 (3.2%) 1 (10%) 4 (0.9%) 1 (1.4%)
Medication error 100 (20.7%) 4 (2.3%) 1 (4.8%) 13 (2.8%) 15 (21.1%)
Patient abuse 3 (1.7%)
Patient accident 15 (3.1%) 7 (4.0%) 212 (95.9%) 1 (4.8%)
Self-harming behaviour 1 (0.2%)
Treatment, procedure 44 (9.1%) 18 (10.2%) 4 (40%) 11 (52.4%) 264 (57.1%) 16 (22.5%)
Total 484 176 221 10 21 462 40
Table 6 Patient administration system: infection control incident
Diagnosis 1 Diagnosis 2 Diagnosis 3 Diagnosis 4 Diagnosis 5 Diagnosis 6 Procedure 1
I803 , Phlebitis and
thrombophlebitis of
lower extremities
unspecified
I739 , Peripheral
vascular disease
unspecified
I10X , Essential
(primary)
hypertension
T814 , Infection
following a procedure
not classified elsewhere
B956 , Staph aureus
as cause of dis
classified to other
chapters
N390 , Urinary-
tract infection site
not specified
L592 , Bypass of femoral artery
by anastomosis of femoral artery
to popliteal artery using prosthesis
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Our analyses, which focused on seven data sources,
indicated that the Clinical Incident database, the main database
used by many trusts to monitor patient safety incidents,
identifies relatively few incidents overall. This finding is in
line with previous studies.4 7 21 In addition, each source
picked up its own unique collection of incidents in terms of
type and levels of harm, with minimal overlap between
sources. From the mapping exercise, it is clear that there are
many other data sources found within the hospital setting
which have the potential to provide useful information on
patient safety, particularly if use is tailored to the investigation
of specific problems. Triangulating information from a wider
range of data sources presents an opportunity to gain a greater
understanding of key patient safety issues, including a better
understanding of the common types of incidents, the healthcare
professional groups and types of patients involved, and
important contributory factors. It offers the opportunity to
learn from events that cover the spectrum of patient harm.
Using information from a range of sources can enhance
investigations of key risk areas such as medication errors,
diagnostic testing, infection control or treatments and proce-
dures (see fig 1 for an example). It offers both a mechanism
for ongoing monitoring and an opportunity to better focus
clinical governance activities such as audit or targeted case
note review. The future development of validated patient safety
indicators, similar to those employed by the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) in the US, will
increase the utility of information derived from administrative
data such as PAS.22 Collaborative working between clinical
staff, clinical risk teams and information technology is essential
to make the most of all the data sources available. Staff
cooperation, in turn, depends on the presence of an open and
fair culture, with an emphasis on learning from incidents rather
than apportioning blame.
Table 7 Proportion of incidents in different harm grades for each data source, April 2004 to March 2005
Clinical incidents Complaints Health & Safety Claims Inquest Case notes
Death 8 (1.7%) 0 0 2 (20%) 21 (100%) 2 (2.8)
Severe 9 (1.9%) 1 (0.6%) 2 (0.9%) 0 0 2 (2.8)
Moderate 28 (5.8%) 18 (10.2%) 3 (1.4%) 2 (20%) 0 18 (25.4%)
Low 114 (23.6%) 38 (21.6%) 86 (38.9%) 6 (60%) 0 35 (49.2%)
No harm impact not prevented 259 (53.5%) 107 (60.8) 127 (57.4%) 0 0 0
No harm impact prevented 66 (13.6%) 0 0 0 0 0
Not possible to code 0 12 (6.8%) 3 (1.4%) 0 0 0
Total 484 176 221 10 21 71
Figure 1 An approach to exploring incidents related to clinical assessment.
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Information plays a vital role in identifying, monitoring and
investigating levels of risk, promoting safer healthcare within
organisations and enabling delivery of the continuous quality
improvement that underpins the clinical governance agenda in
the UK. Chief executives and directors of Trusts are now
accountable for organisation-wide assessment of patient safety
risks. This study highlights the advantages of triangulating
information from a range of sources when making such
assessments. Leadership from senior managers is vital to
promote a culture that promotes the sharing of information
derived from these sources among different departments. The
directors are also in a position, based on the findings from local
investigations or intelligence received from external sources, to
identify key risk areas requiring further investigation anywhere
in the hospital and to provide the resources needed to ensure
that the methodology and findings from such investigations
are disseminated and further in depth work such as audit is
commissioned if necessary. Such a targeted approach to
improving patient safety would allow for the most efficient
use of scarce resources. Clinical governance teams could provide
technical support to departmental staff, helping them to
identify and exploit information sources that are relevant for
a particular investigation, along with advice on search strate-
gies, collation and analysis of these data. Work to overcome the
limitations of some data sources, such as improvement of the
quality and consistency of electronically coded information or
institution of new data collection systems to address key
knowledge gaps could be part of this support. Such an approach
need not be restricted to acute hospitals although the challenges
relating to sharing information across the primary-secondary
care interface are likely to be more significant.
The NPSA’s National Reporting and Learning System draws
the majority of the incident reports it uses for monitoring
national trends from LRMS. The agency acknowledges that
incident reporting systems alone can never be relied upon to
provide a comprehensive picture of patient safety.1 At a national
level, the NPSA draws more widely on intelligence from a range
of sources both within and external to the NHS via its Patient
Safety Observatory to better characterise patient safety issues.
At the local level, data from a broader range of local sources
would also seem to offer valuable supplementary information to
the NPSA. Such findings could reach the agency via its network
of Patient Safety Managers who currently work closely with
individual Trusts.
In conclusion, gaining intelligence on patient safety incidents
from a broader range of information sources has the potential to
provide healthcare organisations with a better picture of key
patient safety risks thus facilitating targeting of scare resources
on appropriate interventions with the potential to improve
patient safety.
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